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I. INTRODUCTION
At its core, trademark law aims to prevent consumer confusion and protect
business investment with a property right.1 Business entities utilize trademarks
to distinguish their products from others available on the market.2 When
investigating allegations of trademark infringement, courts embark on a case-bycase inquiry that considers a number of factors surrounding marketplace
conditions and behavior.3 The inquiry overall seeks to reduce consumer
research costs by evaluating whether or not consumers would be confused by
the infringing mark.4
When Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, it streamlined existing
trademark legislation5 and codified certain prevailing common law consumer
protections.6 Two provisions stemming from the common law provide
remedies to mark owners: § 1116 for injunctive relief and § 1117 for monetary
relief.7 Specifically, § 1117 provided for damages through disgorgement, which
allows a mark owner to recover the percentage of its economic loss attributable
to an infringer’s illegal activities.8 Historically, mark owners were only eligible
to receive disgorgement damages in instances of willful infringement.9
Innocent infringement could not be subject to disgorgement.
To ensure effective consumer protection, Congress has amended the
Lanham Act nearly twenty times since its inception.10 An amendment in 1999
sought to clarify the statute’s protections regarding trademark dilution, defined
as the diminished distinctiveness of famous trademarks.11 Because Congress
sought to criminalize only willful instances of dilution, it added additional
1 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:33
(4th ed. 2014).
2 Id. § 3:2.
3 Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an
Account of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 872–73 (2002).
4 Id.
5 Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark owner to Recover
an Infringer’s Profits Under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 262
(2008).
6 Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 245, 300 (2010).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117 (2012).
8 Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909,
1910 (1997).
9 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 283.
10 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5.
11 Bertanga, supra note 5, at 266.
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language to § 1117.12 However, this addition perplexed courts, making judges
unsure whether or not the amendment removed the need for mark owners to
prove willfulness before receiving disgorgement damages.13 For the past fifteen
years, this uncertainty has created a frustrating circuit split that has divided
judges on the interpretation of a willfulness requirement.
A June 2014 decision from the district court of Connecticut, Romag Fasteners,
Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., provides a clear illustration of the confusion caused by the
Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment.14 In that case, Romag Fasteners designed
patent-protected magnetic purse fasteners.15 It distinguished its fasteners from
others on the market by using a “Romag” trademark.16 In 2002, Romag entered
an agreement with Fossil, Inc., another handbag manufacturer,17 permitting
Fossil’s use of Romag fasteners in its products.18 Several years later, Romag
Fasteners discovered Fossil counterfeited and purchased fasteners beyond the
scope of their agreement.19 The parties reached a settlement agreement
regarding the use of these counterfeited fasteners.20 Romag Fasteners, however,
continued to find its fasteners in Fossil products in department stores in the
years following their initial allegations.21 As a result, it filed suit in the district
court of Connecticut.22
Romag Fasteners raised a number of claims against Fossil, including
trademark infringement.23 In the first phase of the trial, the jury found that
Fossil infringed Romag Fasteners’ mark24 and determined that one percent of
Fossil’s profits were attributable to its infringing actions.25 This percentage
constituted disgorgement damages, requiring the jury to award Romag
Fasteners a portion of Fossil’s profits to compensate for its economic losses.26
12 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (adding the phrase “or a willful violation
under section 1125(c) of this title”).
13 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 863–64 (describing circuit courts’ confusion over awarding
mark owners’ disgorgement damages and providing mark owners with a portion of an infringer’s
profits).
14 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85 (D. Conn. 2014).
15 Id. at 91.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 92.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 95.
23 Id. at 96.
24 Id. at 90.
25 Id. at 106.
26 Id.
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The jury’s disgorgement calculations returned $90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits
under an unjust enrichment rationale and $6,704,046.00 under a deterrence
theory.27 Fossil contested this award.28 Although the jury found Fossil liable
for trademark infringement, it did not find this infringement was willful.29
Fossil then questioned the jury’s damage award by arguing that willfulness was a
However, Romag Fasteners
prerequisite for awarding disgorgement.30
countered, stating that the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act effectively
abrogated any preexisting willfulness requirement.31
In its lengthy discussion of disgorgement, the District Court of Connecticut
highlighted the uncertainty surrounding willful infringement resulting from the
1999 amendment and the resulting circuit split.32 After considering the various
approaches employed by the circuit courts, the Romag Fasteners, Inc. court held
willfulness was a prerequisite for awarding disgorgement damages.33 This
finding was based on the court’s interpretation of the 1999 amendment, which
did not indicate an abrogation of the willfulness requirement.34 Because the
jury did not find Fossil had willfully infringed Romag Fastener’s mark, the court
concluded that Romag Fasteners was not eligible to receive disgorgement
damages at Fossil’s expense.35
Although this case was decided within the Second Circuit, Romag Fasteners,
Inc. highlights the universal need for clarity in the relationship between willful
infringement and disgorgement damages across circuits. Originally, § 1117 of
the Lanham Act did not contain any language pertaining to willfulness, as the
statute imputed the willfulness requirement contained in the common law.36
While Congress’s 1999 amendment intended to criminalize willful instance of
trademark dilution,37 judges remain confused about whether the amendment
had any effect on the disgorgement of profits unlawfully gained from nonfamous marks.

Id. at 90.
Id.
29 Id. at 91.
30 Id. at 109.
31 Id. at 107.
32 Id. at 110.
33 Id. at 109 (“[T]his Court is persuaded by those authorities that have concluded that a finding
of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendant’s profits in this Circuit.”).
34 Id. at 111 (“[T]he legislative history gives no support to the argument that the 1999
amendments were intended to abrogate the common-law willfulness requirement.”).
35 Id.
36 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 869.
37 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999).
27
28
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The perplexity experienced by circuit courts is apparent in other nondilution infringement actions decided after Congress’s amendment. Since 1999,
only one circuit court, the Tenth, has affirmatively retained a willfulness
requirement in the disgorgement context.38 Three circuits have abrogated
willfulness from its disgorgement analysis completely.39 More starkly, four
circuits have expressly declined to address the role of willfulness, which serves
as evidence of the ambiguity resulting from Congress’s actions in 1999.40
Specifically, courts within the Second Circuit remain deeply divided over
This
willfulness’s proper place in awarding disgorgement damages.41
ambivalence and uncertainty has plagued courts for far too long. To properly
inform mark owners of disgorgement’s availability and potential infringers of
potential liability, a clear stance on the requirement of willfulness for the
disgorgement remedy is necessary.
This Note seeks to determine willfulness’ proper place when awarding
damages disgorged from an infringer’s profits. Part II of this Note will provide
the necessary context for the willfulness debate. It describes the purpose of
trademark protection and various legislative actions taken to properly preserve
that protection. In addition, it also details the three ways circuit courts have
approached willfulness in the disgorgement context.
Part III then argues that courts should require a showing of willfulness
before awarding disgorgement damages in infringement actions. More
specifically, it will argue that Congress’s silence on willful infringement beyond
dilution indicates a desire to retain the common law requirement of willfulness.
Part III will also argue that damage-based policies of compensation, unjust
enrichment, and deterrence are furthered when willfulness is required. It then
concludes by showing that abrogating a willfulness requirement extends the
scope of the 1999 amendment beyond its intended purpose. Finally, Part IV
will reemphasize that all courts should adopt the Romag Fasteners, Inc. court’s
persuasive reasoning by requiring willfulness before awarding an accounting of
a defendant’s profits.

38 See Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269 (10th
Cir. 2005).
39 The three circuits are the Third, Fourth, and Fifth. See Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage
Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir.
2005); Synergistic Intern., LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2006).
40 These four circuits include the First, Second, Eighth, and Ninth. See Fishman Transducers,
Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2012); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85
(D. Conn. 2014); Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., 631 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2011); M2 Software
Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 223 Fed. App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2007).
41 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 108.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Romag Fasteners, Inc. decision indicates the continued uncertainty
regarding willfulness’ role in awarding disgorgement damages. To properly
assess the existing circuit split and to propose an appropriate solution, this Note
provides a history of the courts’ division. This Part specifically describes the
relevant background, policy, and case law pertaining to the circuit split,
beginning with a brief description of trademark law’s purpose and the remedies
available under § 1117. A discussion of the 1999 amendment of § 1117 and
different formulations of willfulness follows. Finally, this Part concludes by
describing the three ways circuit courts view willfulness’ application to
disgorgement: (1) as a requirement, (2) as a mere consideration, or (3) as a
nebulous question worth avoiding.
A. DEFINING TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

A trademark is a symbol or phrase identifying a good or service’s origin.42
Trademark protection’s primary purpose is to distinguish these goods and
services from others available on the market.43 Trademarks also aid with
advertising by attributing goods or services to a particular source44 and serve as
a symbol of a business’ success.45 By identifying potentially desirable products
or products satisfactory to customers in the past, trademarks can provide their
owners with economic rewards.46 The heart of trademark law, however, seeks
to protect consumers from confusion and deceit in the marketplace.47 If
consumers are confused and unable to distinguish between similar products
within the market, the uncertainty impedes healthy economic competition.48
Trademark owners can respond to possible consumer confusion created by
two similar marks by establishing a claim for trademark infringement.49 The
central inquiry in an infringement analysis is whether there is a likelihood of
confusion between the products produced by the mark owner and the alleged
infringer.50 Generally, circuit courts establish their own distinct multi-factor

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:1.
Id. § 3:2.
Id.
Id.
Bertagna, supra note 5, at 262.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:33.
Id.
Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 872.
Id.
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tests to evaluate the likelihood of confusion.51 Many courts use an infringement
analysis evaluating numerous non-exhaustive factors.52 These factors can
include whether: (1) the marks physically resemble each other, (2) the products
identified by the marks are similar, (3) the products were targeted at similar
consumers, and (4) the conditions for purchasing the respective products were
comparable.53 Although these factors are persuasive, the unique nature of
infringement claims requires a case-by-case analysis.54 In all, courts consider the
totality of the circumstances in evaluating alleged infringement.55
B. THE LANHAM ACT AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS

The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 as trademark owners’ safeguard
against infringing behavior.56 Fifteen U.S.C. 1125 of the Lanham Act codified
the likelihood of confusion test to guide courts throughout an infringement
analysis.57 The test also describes the categories of claims covered by the Act.58
These claims include the infringement of unregistered trademarks, false
advertising, false attribution, trademark dilution, and trade dress infringement.59
Before the Lanham Act’s enactment, the common law allowed trademark
owners to receive monetary relief from courts of law and injunctive relief from
courts of equity.60 Congress streamlined these distinctive infringement
remedies by providing for injunctive relief in 15 U.S.C. § 1116 and monetary
relief in 15 U.S.C. § 1117.61 Before 1999, § 1117(a) did not contain any
reference to willfulness and read:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under
section 125(a) or (d) of this title . . . [has] been established in any
civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be
entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1)

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1.
Id.
Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 872–73.
Id.
Id. at 873.
Corgill, supra note 8, at 1910.
15 U.S.C. 1125 (2015); see also Thurmon, supra note 6, at 252 n.29.
15 U.S.C. § 1125.
Id.; see also Thurmon, supra note 6, at 252 n.29.
Thurmon, supra note 6, at 267.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117.
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defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff,
and (3) the costs of the action.
The first category of monetary damages—an accounting of the infringer’s
profits—is a known as disgorgement and is popular remedy for trademark
owners.62 Disgorgement’s equitable origin forces the court to weigh the
individual circumstances of each case before giving a trademark owner an award
of profits.63 An infringer’s profits may be awarded absent any actual damages
to the plaintiff, but are never a matter of right and may be denied if the court
finds a different remedy more appropriate.64
Disgorgement damages serve a number of remedial policies. When a mark
owner and an infringer compete in the same market, disgorging a defendant’s
profit serves a compensatory purpose.65 By awarding disgorgement damages,
courts seek to provide mark owners with a rough estimate of their lost sales
attributable directly to the infringer’s illegal activities.66 This remedy assumes
the mark owner would have gained the entirety of an infringer’s profits absent
the infringement.67 Because of this generous assumption, courts find
disgorgement damages can satisfactorily provide for a mark owner’s lost sales in
a competitive market.68
If a mark owner and an infringer do not directly compete, disgorgement
serves alternative purposes.69 Without a competitive relationship between the
However,
parties, the compensatory rationale is not well-served.70
disgorgement damages can deter potential infringers by eliminating the
Additionally, disgorgement may
economic incentive of infringement.71
counteract any unjust enrichment gained at the expense of a mark owner.72 A
disgorgement award absent actual damages is usually predicated on either unjust
enrichment or deterrence theories.73
Corgill, supra note 8, at 1910.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59.
64 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926.
65 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59 (describing disgorgement as a way to compensate a mark
owner for sales lost to an infringer).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1928.
72 Id. at 1932 (defining unjust enrichment as profits unjust for an infringer to retain).
73 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th
Cir. 2005).
62
63
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C. THE FEDERAL DILUTION ACT OF 1995, THE LANHAM ACT’S 1999
AMENDMENT, AND WILLFULNESS DEFINED

While § 1125 of the Lanham Act created monetary remedies for wronged
mark owners, it did not comprehensively describe remedies for all forms of
infringement.74 Courts found nothing in the Lanham Act relevant to the use of
similar marks on non-competing products.75 In response, Congress created the
Federal Dilution Act of 1995.76 Dilution occurs when a product denoted by an
infringing mark affects a famous mark’s distinctiveness.77 The plain language of
the Federal Dilution Act gives a mark owner access to the monetary remedies
of section § 1117 if dilution was willfully committed.78 However, Congress felt
further clarification was required.79
Hence, in 1999, Congress amended § 1117.80 With the changes, the section
now reads: “[When] a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a
willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title [has been established] . . . the
plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover (1) defendant’s profits.”81 The
remaining language of this section remained the same.82 The purpose of this
additional language was to “harmonize section 1117(a) with the recent Federal
Dilution Act of 1995.”83 Some scholars speculate that the amendment sought
to address online infringement and cyber-squatters.84 However, Congress was
instead concerned that the remedies for trademark dilution under federal law
were not properly articulated.85 In the same amendment, Congress sought to
cancel a diluting mark ex ante, with an injunction, instead of ex post, with
damages.86 By imposing an injunction before dilution occurred, Congress
“allow[ed] the right to oppose or seek cancellation of a mark hopefully before
harm has occurred.”87
Bertagna, supra note 5, at 265.
Id.
76 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, Stat. 985 (1996).
77 Id.; see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing the Starbucks trademark as “famous” under the Lanham Act and subject to
protection from dilution).
78 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 267.
79 Id. at 266.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Romag Fastners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 110 (D. Conn. 2014).
84 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 297.
85 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999).
86 Id.
87 Id.
74
75
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However, as discussed, Congress’s addition of language concerning
willfulness in 1999 has affected damages awards and confused judges
nationwide.88 Specifically, it is difficult to pinpoint an exact definition of
willfulness, which is evaluated based on the facts of a particular dispute.89
Overall, courts agree with the distinction between willfulness’ function in the
civil and criminal contexts.90 Willfulness distinguishes intentional conduct from
accidental actions in the civil context;91 in criminal law, the defendant acts
willfully if he seeks to cause injury with the awareness of his actions’ unlawful
nature.92
Without more guidance from Congress, however, circuit courts have crafted
their own unique definitions of willfulness in the trademark context.93
Typically, these definitions mimic the criminal law’s treatment of willful
conduct.94 Infringers must act with the intent to deceive or confuse consumers
in order to be guilty of willful infringement.95 In other words, infringers must
be aware that their actions (1) violate the law and (2) deprive mark owners of
their protected trademark rights.96 Despite inherent variations, circuit courts
approach and apply willfulness in one of three ways, as discussed below.
D. WILLFULNESS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR DISGORGEMENT

While wrestling with the definition of willfulness, courts have also struggled
with applying the 1999 amendment’s language to determine the monetary
damages available under § 1117.97 Although Congress sought to clarify the
remedies available to victims of dilution in the 1999 Amendment, it remained
silent about how the newly added willfulness language would affect the owners
of non-famous marks.98 Circuit courts remain divided and uncertain about
willfulness’ importance in the disgorgement context.99
1. The Tenth Circuit’s Requirement of Willfulness. The only circuit court
retaining willfulness as a prerequisite for awarding disgorgement damages is the
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Bertagna, supra note 5, at 268.
Id.
Id. at 268–69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 110–11 (D. Conn. 2014).
Id. at 188.
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Tenth Circuit.100 In 2005, the court in Western Diversified Servs., Inc. justified the
role of willfulness in allowing disgorgement damages absent actual damages in
order to balance the principles of equity.101 The plaintiff in this case marketed
automobile warranties with two registered marks: “advantage” and “advantage
plus.”102 Several years later, the defendant began marketing warranties using the
same language.103 When the defendant refused to stop using these phrases at
the plaintiff’s request, the plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement.104
The Tenth Circuit ultimately reversed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff raised genuine issues of
material fact regarding the willfulness of the defendant’s infringement.105 In
recognizing that the potential for inequality is heightened by the possibility of a
mark owner receiving a windfall through an accounting of infringer’s profits, as
well as the potential punitive effect on infringers, the court held that willful
infringement must be established before providing a trademark owner with
disgorgement damages.106 However, “[e]ven with a finding of willfulness, a
court may still exercise its discretion to reduce or even eliminate a profit award”
in the need of equity.107 Therefore, the court enumerated a two-step process
for an award of profits: “(1) a finding of willfulness or bad faith; and (2) a
weighing of the equities.”108
The Tenth Circuit further justified this two-step process based on various
remedial theories, stating that an award of profits in the absence of actual
damages is usually based on either an unjust enrichment or deterrence
rationale.109 If infringement is not willful, courts should merely award remedies
to compensate a mark owner’s reputational loss.110 However, when someone
willfully infringes another’s trademark rights, court should instead focus on an
infringer’s conduct and “unauthorized use” under an unjust an enrichment
theory.111 In the court’s view, the unjust enrichment rationale conceptualizes
trademark infringement as interference with an owner’s “protected property
100 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.
2005).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1271.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1277.
106 Id. at 1272–73.
107 Id. at 1273.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1272.
110 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931.
111 Id. at 1968.
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rights.”112 Willful infringers act with the intent to cause injury and knowledge
of their actions’ unlawfulness,113 obtaining profits by encroaching on a mark
owner’s rights.114 Therefore, under an unjust enrichment rational, disgorgement
returns profits unjustly retained by infringers to their proper owner.115
A deterrence rationale is similarly applicable to instances of willful
infringement.116 This rationale, in contrast to a compensatory purpose,117
informs the public of an action’s wrongful nature in order to prevent future
infringement.118 “Without the dire threat of an accounting for the purpose of
deterrence,” individuals will be encouraged to infringe on trademarks without
certain punishment.119 The promise of disgorgement can disgorgement can
dissuade future infringement with the promise of punishment.120 However,
these damages must be cautiously awarded, as the Lanham Act prohibits
punitive trademark damages.121
Disgorgement damages properly strike the balance between deterring and
punishing infringers.122 They remove economic incentives of infringement
while “[leaving] the infringer no worse off than if the infringer had not
infringed in the first place.”123 Because deterrence theory seeks to make an
example of unlawful conduct with the aim of preventing future potential
infringers from choosing to infringe, it is not particularly applicable to nonwillful infringement.124 Like an unjust enrichment rationale of recovery,
deterrence theory depends on the infringer’s wrongful action, not the injury
suffered by the mark owner.125
In the court’s view, the unjust enrichment rationale conceptualizes
trademark ownership as a property right.126 Trademark infringement interferes
Western Diversified Servs., Inc., 427 F.3d at 1272.
Bertagna, supra note 5, at 272.
114 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1929.
117 Id. at 1926.
118 Id.
119 Bryan M. Otake, The Continuing Viability of The Deterrence Rationale In Trademark Infringement
Accounts, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 221, 243 (1998).
120 Id. (detailing the appeal of infringement by large corporate infringers in the absence of
disgorgement damages as a deterrent).
121 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1929.
125 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th
Cir. 2005).
126 Id.
112
113
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with these “protected property rights.”127 Altogether, after considering
rationales of unjust enrichment and deterrence and properly scrutinizing a
disgorgement award on equitable grounds, the Tenth Circuit views willfulness
as a necessary requirement.128
E. WILLFULNESS AS A CONSIDERATION FOR DISGORGEMENT

1. The Fifth Circuit’s Factor-Based Consideration of Willfulness. In light of the
1999 Lanham Act amendment, several circuits instead abrogated the willfulness
requirement from their disgorgement analyses. The Fifth Circuit, for example,
defined willful infringement as a mere equitable consideration for disgorgement
instead of an ironclad prerequisite.129 In Quick Technologies v. Sage Group PLC,
the plaintiff expanded its business into the database industry,130 using the mark
“SAGE INFORMATION SYSTEM” to market its new business.131
Simultaneously, the defendant created a national brand using the mark
The parties attempted to negotiate use of the “SAGE
“Sage.”132
INFORMATION SYSTEM” mark.133 After these negotiations broke down,
the defendant filed an application to register its “Sage” mark with the Patent
and Trademark Office.134 The plaintiff subsequently alleged trademark
infringement.135
In considering a disgorgement damage award, the Fifth Circuit recognized
its long-standing dedication to “[achieving] equity between or among the
parties.”136 The court expressed concerns about providing mark owners with a
windfall of an infringer’s profits if an injunction would provide an adequate
remedy.137 While the court acknowledged the Tenth Circuit’s adoption of a
willfulness requirement,138 it refused to impose one itself.139 Instead, it
employed a factor-based approach.140 Before awarding an accounting of a
defendant’s profits, the Fifth Circuit considers the following: “(1) whether the
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id.
Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/8

14

Zisek: Where There's a Will, There's a Way: Reconciling Theories of Will

2015]

WHERE THERE’S A WILL, THERE’S A WAY

477

defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have been
diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any unreasonable delay by the
plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public interest in making the misconduct
unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a case of palming off.”141
2. The Third Circuit’s Application of the Fifth Circuit’s Test. The Third Circuit
subsequently applied Quick Technologies’ factor analysis while considering the
congressional intent behind the 1999 amendment of § 1117142 in Banjo Buddies,
Inc. The plaintiff in this case sold a popular fishing lure set called the Banjo
Minnow.143 The defendant was a member of the Board of Directors during the
Banjo Minnow’s success in the market.144 During his time in office, the
defendant suggested a new lure set called the Bionic Minnow to his fellow
board members.145 Several members expressed reservations about the idea, so
the defendant began marketing the Bionic Minnow through his own
company.146 The plaintiff then sued under § 1125 of the Lanham Act.147
After employing the Fifth Circuit’s factor analysis,148 the Third Circuit
allowed the plaintiff’s recovery of the defendant’s profits.149 Although the court
considered willfulness, it did not require a finding of such.150 While Third Circuit
decisions previously required a trademark owner to prove an infringer’s
willfulness before receiving disgorgement damages, the Banjo Buddies court
found the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act superseded this requirement.151
Notably, the court found the amendment’s plain language only applied to
trademark dilution, not infringement of non-famous marks.152 The court also
presumed Congress was aware that most courts had adopted a willfulness
requirement in their disgorgement analyses.153 Therefore, the Third Circuit
determined that Congress’s explicit limitation of willfulness to trademark

Id.
Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005).
143 Id. at 171.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 171–72.
147 Id. at 172.
148 Id. at 177.
149 Id. at 180.
150 Id. at 171.
151 Id. at 174.
152 Id.
153 Id. (citing Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1525 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e must presume that
Congress is aware of existing judicial interpretations of statutes.”(alteration in original))).
141
142
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dilution was a deliberate effort to abrogate the requirement in other parts of
§ 1117.154
3. The Fourth Circuit Removes Willfulness. The Fourth Circuit similarly viewed
willfulness as a mere factor in awarding disgorgement damages in the 2006 case
of Synergistic Intern., LLC v. Korman.155 The plaintiff repaired and installed glass
doors in this case,156 advertising with the trademark “GLASS DOCTOR®.”157
The defendant owned her own windshield repair business called “THE
WINDSHIELD DOCTOR,”158 but, unaware of the plaintiff’s trademark,
advertised her company in the local yellow pages as “GLASS DOCTOR.”159
Although the defendant eventually stopped using the “GLASS DOCTOR”
language, she believed “THE WINDSHIELD DOCTOR” was protected under
trademark law and continued using the language to advertise her business.160
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit for unfair competition and trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act.161
The Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the Fifth and Third Circuits.162
According to the court, if an infringer did not act willfully, disgorgement
damages should not be imposed.163 However, willfulness did not serve as an
ironclad requirement for disgorgement.164 Interestingly, the court also noted
that a willfulness requirement would have been more persuasive before the
1999 amendment.165 Because the amendment’s language was added in the
disjunctive, however, the Fourth Circuit found that willfulness was merely a
“highly pertinent factor.”166

154 Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress indicates
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”)).
155 470 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2006).
156 Id. at 166.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 167.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 168.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 175.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 175 n.13.
166 Id.
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F. AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS WILLFULNESS

1. The First Circuit Stalls. Although the previously discussed circuit courts
have taken a clear stance on willfulness, other courts continue to struggle with
the Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment. These latter courts choose not to directly
address whether willfulness is required in a disgorgement analysis167 but have
nonetheless recognized the existing circuit split and generally assume a
requirement of willfulness.168
The First Circuit applied such an assumption169 in Fishman Transducers, Inc.
In that case, the plaintiff manufactured amplification equipment used in
guitars.170 The defendant, a vendor of consumer goods, sold guitars and
accidentally misidentified the instruments’ amplification equipment as belonging
to the plaintiff’s.171 In response, the plaintiff brought a number of claims,
including trademark infringement.172 In reaching its holding, the court
distinguished the role of willfulness in “ordinary infringement” actions from
willful ones.173 In the context of ordinary infringement, willfulness typically
helps courts choose the best remedy for a particular case.174 While willfulness is
not a requirement for awarding every category of damages, stare decisis in the
First Circuit dictated that the court should typically require willfulness as a
prerequisite for disgorgement damages.175 The First Circuit did not extend its
analysis beyond recognizing the actions of these other courts.
2. The Eighth Circuit Avoids The Question. The Eighth Circuit merely
recognized the prevailing circuit split without adding its own commentary.176 In
Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed
on its trademark identifying her deceased husband’s medical treatment
programs.177 The court briefly addressed the circuit split in its opinion’s final
footnote.178 After acknowledging courts’ divisions on the questions, the Eighth
Circuit chose not to decide the question.179 However, it recognized it would
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 108–09 (D. Conn. 2014).
Id.
Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 634 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012).
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id.
Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., 631 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 472 n.2.
Id.
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likely require willfulness before awarding disgorgement damages, based on the
analyses of other courts.180
3. The Ninth Circuit Dismisses Willfulness. The Ninth Circuit was similarly
dismissive of the willfulness question. In M2 Software v. Viacom Inc., the plaintiff
sued the defendant for trademark infringement and dilution.181 On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that the Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment clearly eliminated any
requirement of willfulness.182 However, the Ninth Circuit characterized this
assertion as a “shaky assumption” before quickly dismissing it.183
4. The Second Circuit as a Quintessential Example of the Circuit Split. Before the
1999 Lanham Act amendment, the Second Circuit viewed willful infringement
as a requirement for disgorgement damages.184 A prime example of this strict
application took place in George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral Inc. and involved a
plaintiff who manufactured metal polish while using the “NEVER-DULL”
mark.185 The defendant, who sold polishing products, misappropriated this
mark, prompting the plaintiff to sue for trademark infringement.186 Like the
Tenth Circuit in Western Diversified Servs., Inc., the court was apprehensive about
a mark owner receiving a windfall from an award of a defendant’s profits.187 To
prevent this unnecessary windfall and to avoid potentially unjust treatment of
innocent infringers, the Second Circuit plainly asserted, “a plaintiff must prove
that an infringer acted with willful deception before the infringer’s profits are
recoverable by way of an accounting.”188
The Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment troubled the Second Circuit, which
refused to directly address the role of willfulness in subsequent decisions as, for
example,189 in Fendi Adele, S.R.L., where the plaintiff sued another purse
manufacturer for selling purses containing its trademark.190 Like the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, the second circuit applied a presumption of willfulness’
requirement to properly assess the defendant’s actions.191

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Id.
M2 Software Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 223 Fed. App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 986 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
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The Second Circuit’s refusal to define willful infringement’s place in
disgorgement since the 1999 amendment has deeply divided its lower courts.192
While some lower courts find that the plain language of the 1999 amendment
eliminated any previous willfulness requirement,193 the majority of courts within
the Second Circuit embraced willfulness as a prerequisite for disgorgement
damages, as in Romag Fasteners, Inc.194 Employing similar reasoning as other
circuits across the country, some courts emphasize the willfulness requirement’s
applicability to instances of trademark dilution instead of the infringement of
non-famous marks.195 Other courts examined the amendment’s language and
found a literal reading of the text only affected trademark dilution remedies.196
The Second Circuit exemplifies the confusion inherent in the Lanham Act’s
1999 amendment. The circuit steadfastly required a showing of willfulness
before the amendment.197 Once the amendment changed the language of
§ 1117, the court explicitly refused to answer a question it could once easily
answer.198 Because the Second Circuit did not outline the weight to give
willfulness, the lower courts within the Second Circuit remain split on the issue,
demonstrating the need to define.199 The role of willfulness when awarding
disgorgement damages.
III. ANALYSIS
With disgorgement’s increasing popularity as a remedy for trademark
infringement, courts need a resolution to the long-standing circuit split
described above. Providing an answer to this question will ensure mark owners
and infringers alike are properly affected by disgorgement damages. In the
fifteen years since the 1999 Lanham Act amendment, circuit courts approached
the role of willfulness in disgorgement in three ways: (1) as a requirement, (2) as
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 108–09 (D. Conn. 2014).
Chanel, Inc. v. Veronique Idea Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 252, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that
“[t]he Court remains persuaded that a showing of willfulness is no longer a prerequisite for an
award of damages under § 1125(a)”).
194 Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy, Co., 983 F. Supp. 354, 364–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding
a willfulness requirement).
195 Guthrie Healthcare System v. ContextMedia, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7992 (KBF), 2014 WL
185222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014); GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d
457, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
196 Life Servs. Supplements, Inc. v. Natural Organics, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6040(SHS), 2007 WL
4437168, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007).
197 George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 986 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1992).
198 Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 26, 31 (2d Cir. 2013).
199 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 108.
192
193
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a mere consideration, or (3) as a nebulous issue worth avoiding. This Note
suggests that adopting the first of these approaches would correctly resolve this
long-standing circuit split for three reasons.
First, requiring proof of willfulness is consistent with the legislative intent of
the 1999 amendment.200 Congress only intended to clarify ambiguities within
the newly created area of federal trademark dilution.201 In fact, Congress’s
silence on disgorgement damages indicates its desire to retain the existing
remedial scheme for other forms of trademark misappropriation.202
Second, an explicit requirement of willfulness would also further the
remedial theories underlying disgorgement damages. These rationales include
compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence.203 A key motivation behind
awarding disgorgement damages is a desire to compensate victims of
infringement.204 Although complete compensation is nearly impossible,
providing relief for mark owners is especially justified in instances of willful
infringement.205 Requiring a showing of willfulness corrects unjust enrichment
by restoring faith in the market economy, providing remedies to parties affected
by infringement, and setting an appropriate standard for conducting business.206
Moreover, a deterrence rationale requires a showing of willfulness infringement
to adequately stop future wrongful conduct.207
Third, the legislative history behind the Lanham Act endorses the
interpretation of willfulness as a requirement. Advocates of the second
approach—merely considering willfulness—read the amendment’s language
differently. They believe the addition of the word “willful” into the statute
applied to violations of both trademark dilution and the infringement of nonfamous marks.208 Proponents of willfulness’ abrogation, on the other hand,
state that Congress intended to punish cybersquatters and clarify the federal
dilution scheme.209 However, the statute’s legislative history tells a different
story.

145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999).
Id. (“This legislation is a necessary follow-up to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 . . . the bill before us today is necessary to clear up certain issues in the interpretation of the
dilution act which the Federal courts have grappled with since its enactment.”).
202 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 110–11.
203 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1915.
204 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 879–80.
205 Id. at 880.
206 Id. at 882.
207 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1929.
208 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 291.
209 Id.
200
201
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In light of these justifications, Congress should amend § 1117 further to
clarify that the 1999 changes to the statute only apply to dilution offenses,
thereby explicitly defining willfulness as a requirement for disgorgement
damages. In lieu of congressional intervention, the Supreme Court should
alternatively step in and articulate willfulness’ proper place in the disgorgement
analysis. After years of confusion and division, this question deserves a proper
answer. Where there is a will, there is a way.
A. CONGRESS’S SILENCE CONCERNING WILLFULNESS INDICATES RETAINING A
WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT IS PROPER

When the legislature enacts a statute, it is done with a particular “aim in
mind.”210 To fully understand Congress’s approach to the 1999 amendment to
§ 1117 of the Lanham Act, examining the legislative approach to the Lanham
Act as a whole provides valuable insight into the proper role of willfulness in
the disgorgement context. Such an examination shows that Congress’s silence
on willful infringement in the 1999 amendment does not abrogate the necessity
of its showing. Instead, the silence shows a desire to maintain the status quo—
a prevailing requirement of willful infringement before disgorgement damages
can be awarded to mark owners.
The Constitution does not expressly provide Congress the authority to
regulate trademarks.211 However, the legislature has dedicated itself to
protecting trademark owners since the nineteenth century. It first attempted to
codify protections available under the common law in 1881.212 In subsequent
years, the regulatory landscape of trademark law was increasingly scattered. It
was unclear whether the power of trademark regulation belonged to the states
or the federal government, which led to a scattered collection of laws that
existed on both levels.213 Congress streamlined this “disorderly patchwork of
legislation”214 in the Trademark Act of 1905.215
Over twenty bills proposed amendments to the existing Trademark Act of
1905 before the Lanham Act was passed in 1946.216 The damages portion of
these bills reflected the common law perspective on disgorgement, which only
punished non-innocent infringement.217 While the drafters did not comment
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 290.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3.
Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 869.
Bertagna, supra note 5, at 262.
Id.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3.
Thurmon, supra note 6, at 299.
Id. at 301.
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on their views of disgorgement in the legislative record, Congress presumably
wanted to transfer the willfulness requirement into the Lanham Act, as the goal
of the Lanham Act was to encapsulate certain aspects of the common law.218
Based on the common law governing trademarks and case law preceding the
Lanham Act, “one could say with some certainty that a plaintiff in a trademark
case had to prove deceptive intent to obtain a defendant’s profits.”219
Congress has amended the Lanham Act twenty times since its passage in
1946.220 The 1999 amendment sought to clarify confusion surrounding
dilution.221 However, it was silent as to the amendment’s effect on
infringement actions involving non-famous marks. When the Lanham Act was
amended in 1999, Congress was consciously silent regarding changes beyond
the dilution context.222 This silence closely resembles Congress’s silence during
the Lanham Act’s formation. Congress did not address willfulness in the
statute directly to retain its prevailing under the common law.223 Therefore, by
remaining silent, Congress presumably intended to only clarify the portions of
§ 1117 that pertained to dilution.224 This silence indicates that willfulness was
not abrogated by the 1999 amendment and courts should require a finding of
willfulness before awarding disgorgement damages.225
B. REMEDIAL THEORIES UNDERLYING DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS SUPPORT
A WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT

By amending the language of the Lanham Act nearly twenty times during its
history, Congress intended to protect mark owners to the fullest extent
possible.226 In the disgorgement context specifically, Congress wanted to
further various remedial policies, including compensation, unjust enrichment
and deterrence.227
1. Proof of Willfulness Properly Compensates Victims of Trademark Infringement.
Unfortunately, mark owners cannot be fully compensated through
Id. at 300.
Id. at 283.
220 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5.
221 See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
222 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 109 (D. Conn. 2014).
223 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 300.
224 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 109–20 (noting that “[t]he legislative history of the
1999 amendments supports the view that they addressed only recovery in dilution actions, as the
history is silent as to any other intended consequence of the amendments”).
225 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 300.
226 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5.
227 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 888.
218
219
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disgorgement damages because it would be impossible for mark owners to
calculate the exact quantity of commercial harm suffered by an infringing
competitor.228 Nonetheless, principles of compensation are persuasive when
considering a willfulness requirement in the disgorgement context.
Theoretically, disgorgement damages can serve as compensatory by
reimbursing trademark owners for profits lost from an infringer’s actions.229
However, this theory is only convincing when the mark owner and infringer
directly compete in the same market230—when these parties are competitors,
“[t]he defendants’ profit . . . are a rough measure of the plaintiff’s damages.
Indeed, they are probably the best measure of damages available.”231 A
compensatory rationale loses its footing, however, when the parties are not in
economic competition,232 and there is no diversion of sales.233
Although the compensatory rationale admittedly suffers from shortcomings
in the disgorgement context, attempts to repay mark owners for their losses also
seek to offset the mark owner’s loss of goodwill or business reputation from
infringement.234 This policy would be especially relevant when someone
infringes willfully. In that instance, an entity would deliberately seek to divert
sales away from a competitor through infringement, making such a selfinterested move with the knowledge that such conduct is wrongful. An award
of disgorgement damages would therefore make a mark owner whole in light of
a willful infringer’s actions. As a result, requiring willfulness before awarding
disgorgement damages would serve an underlying compensatory purpose, even
if full compensation is not theoretically possible.
2. Proof of Willfulness Corrects Unjust Enrichment. Another rationale served by a
willfulness requirement is unjust enrichment, which seeks to return unmerited
gains from an infringer to the mark owner’s rightful possession.235 It views
trademark infringement as a violation of property rights rightfully belonging to
a mark owner.236 This rationale is distinct from compensation, as the gains of
unjust enrichment could exceed the mark owners’ economic loss.237 In fact, an
unjust enrichment rationale focuses its evaluation on an infringer’s wrongful
Id.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59.
230 Id.
231 Id. (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987)) (alterations in
original).
232 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1921.
233 Id. at 1922.
234 Id. at 1917–18.
235 See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
236 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931.
237 Id.
228
229
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conduct instead of a mark owner’s injury.238 Under an unjust enrichment
theory, disgorging infringers’ profits seeks to undo gains they did not lawfully
obtain.239
At its core, the unjust enrichment rationale serves three purposes.240 First,
“increase confidence in a democratic market economy”; second, it provides a
remedy for parties directly and indirectly impacted by infringing activities; third,
it establishes a proper standard for proper conduct in a competitive business
environment.241 In addition, unjust enrichment retains some of the principles
previously available within courts of equity.242 This theory depends on the
“character of the gains of the infringer and evaluates whether an infringer’s
profits could be lawfully obtained.”243
Disgorging profits unjustly retained by an infringer logically applies to
instances of willful infringement. An intentional, deliberate violation of a mark
owner’s property is illegal. Awarding an infringer’s profits deliberately gained
and wrongfully retained should therefore be returned to mark owners negatively
affected by infringement, which maintains the faith of consumers and produces
in the existing market economy.
Finally, to safeguard against windfalls to the plaintiff, principles of equity
serve as a check on disgorgement when willfulness is required, as the damages
are awarded on a case-by-case basis. Overall, these reasons demonstrate why an
unjust enrichment rationale supports such a requirement of willfulness before
awarding an infringer’s profits.
3. Proof of Willfulness Deters Future Infringement. A final remedial policy
furthered by requiring a showing of willfulness is deterrence of future incidents
of infringement.244 According to this rationale, disgorgement damages serve as
a stick to prevent future infringers from being enticed by the carrot of unethical
and unlawful business practices.245 Like the unjust enrichment rationale, the
deterrence theory fixates on an infringer’s wrongful conduct instead of a mark
owner’s injury.246 Deterrence is an attractive aim because it can prevent future
willful violations of a trademark through disregarding a competitor’s rights,
belittling a competitor’s mark, and blatantly utilizing a mark despite knowledge

238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id.
Thurmon, supra note 6, at 313.
Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 882.
Id.
Id. at 932 (describing the equitable nature of unjust enrichment remedy).
Id.
Id. at 882.
See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926.
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of its previous use.247 This theory indicates to the general public that this
deliberate conduct is wrongful and could be subject to punitive exemplary
damages, subject to equitable limitations.248 However, a deterrence rationale
must walk a fine line to adhere to congressional intent.249 The language of the
Lanham Act prohibits awarding punitive damages solely to punish, so
disgorgement must serve to deter future infringement without excessively
punishing infringing parties.250
The deterrence rationale is particularly persuasive when applied to willful
infringement. When infringers “demonstrate[ ] a callous disregard for the rights
of a competitor and for the mandates of the federal courts,” they should be
dissuaded from acting so disrespectfully in the future.251 Willful infringement
can be analogized to wrongful conduct in violation of tort law.252 It is
presumed that monetary damages would not deter wrongful conduct
committed innocently without any knowledge of wrongfulness.253 As a result,
the deterrence rationale demands application to examples of knowing, willful
infringement.
It prevents infringers from intentionally subverting the
trademark protection system by misrepresenting information or skirting
questions.254 Disgorgement damage awards deter and discourage parties hoping
to undermine business competitors through dishonorable means.
C. MERELY VIEWING WILLFULNESS AS A CONSIDERATION DOES NOT
ACCURATELY REPRESENT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Finally, some courts and commentators maintain that the 1999 amendment
of § 1117 abrogates a willfulness requirement when awarding a disgorgement
damage award.255 However, these approaches expand the scope of the 1999
Otake, supra note 119, at 232–33.
Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926.
249 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 883.
250 Id.
251 Otake, supra note 119, at 241 (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir
1970)).
252 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1929.
253 Id.
254 Otake, supra note 119, at 245.
255 See Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (“In
light of the plain language of § 1117(a), however, we decline to adopt a bright-line rules in which
a showing of willful infringement in a prerequisite to an accounting of profits.”); Synergistic
Intern., LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162 n.13 (4th Cir. 2006) (“We agree that willfulness is not an
essential prerequisite for a damages award, but that it remains a highly pertinent factor.”); Banjo
Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We hold that willfulness . . . has
been superseded by a 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act.”).
247
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amendment beyond its original purpose.256 When the amendment was enacted,
Congress only contemplated trademark dilution.257 It wanted to limit
disgorgement’s availability to instances of willful trademark dilution only.258
Courts like the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits that abrogated a willfulness
requirement “leverage[ ] this statutory change beyond its intended scope to
adjust the equities in ordinary infringement cases in order to make it easier for a
trademark owner to recover profits.”259
Therefore, although many authorities assert that Congress’s silence
concerning non-dilutive infringement requires an abrogation of the willfulness
requirement,260 such silence is consistent with maintaining the status quo in
trademark matters.261 These proponents of abrogation have unnecessarily
removed a requirement that a majority of courts have upheld for decades. This
view is misguided and unnecessarily complicates legislative intent. Contrary to
these assertions, Congress intended to retain willfulness as a requirement and
courts should thus follow that approach.
Proponents of abrogation posit that the 1999 amendment served as a
response to cybersquatters and related trademark dilution offenses instead of
non-dilutive infringement.262 While the legislative history mentions technology,
it does not specifically reference cybersquatting or any relevant case law.263 The
limited nature of the 1999 amendment merely sought to clarify trademark
dilution matters while keeping the existing disgorgement infrastructure intact.
As a consequence, maintaining the prevailing willfulness requirement across the
country is most consistent with congressional intent.
As recently portrayed in Romag Fasteners, Inc., this interpretation issue has
generated long-lasting uncertainty for trademark owners and courts. Either
Congress or the Supreme Court must resolve any remaining uncertainty.
Without requiring willfulness in a disgorgement analysis, courts leave
consumers subject to confusing similarly designated products and mark owners
subject to damage towards which may not adequately compensate their losses.
Infringers also will be deterred from unjust gained profits. The circuit split

MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:62.
145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (“This legislation is a necessary followup to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.”).
258 Id.
259 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:62.
260 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 286–87.
261 See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
262 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 291.
263 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999).
256
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should be resolved by viewing willfulness as a prerequisite for awarding
disgorgement damages, not a mere consideration or a question worth avoiding.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fifteen years following the 1999 amendment of § 1117 have generated a
scattered map of approaches for considering willfulness providing disgorgement
damages to trademark owners. Circuit courts approach willfulness in three
ways: as either a requirement, a mere equitable consideration, or with
ambivalence and avoidance. In light of the persuasive 2014 example of the
Romag Fasteners decision, future courts should view willfulness as a prerequisite
for awarding a disgorgement of an infringer’s profits.
This approach first comports with congressional intent and furthers relevant
remedial policies. Congress’s silence regarding non-dilutive remedies does not,
as some courts and commentators argue, indicate a desire to abrogate
willfulness’s requirement. Rather, it demonstrates a desire to maintain the
common law’s status quo. Before the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act,
most common law courts considering disgorgement damages required a
showing of willfulness, hesitant to punish innocent infringement. Therefore,
the legislature’s refusal to address the role of willfulness in non-famous
infringement actions demonstrates its desire to retain the requirement.
Second, viewing willfulness as a prerequisite is also consistent with the
remedial policies of compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence.
Although the total damages suffered by a mark owner are nearly impossible to
calculate, a disgorgement remedy can compensate a mark owner by providing
an estimate of the economic harm to the owner. An unjust enrichment
rationale seeks to return commercial gains from wrongful activities to their
rightful owner—trademark owners themselves.
Finally, disgorgement’s
availability as a remedy also removes incentives for infringement, thereby
deterring future harm at the expense of trademark owners.
The courts and commentators alternatively abrogating a willfulness
requirement misinterpret the scope of the language in the 1999 amendment and
instead rely on issues like cybersquatting that were not contemplated by the
existing § 1117 infrastructure. Accepting Congress’s intentional silence in the
1999 amendment to maintain the status quo while furthering policies of
compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence demands that willfulness
serve as a prerequisite for disgorgement damages in the trademark context.
Where there’s willful infringement, there’s a way to properly assess
disgorgement damages on behalf of mark owners.
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